1943) and
and British Mandatory Palestine (1918/1920-1948) and Transjordan (1918 Transjordan ( /1922 Transjordan ( -1946 . 2 In these new "national" economies, consumers' demands were often met by suppliers who smuggled goods around customs points. Egypt was the region's leading market for narcotics. Opium was produced mostly in Turkey, and Lebanon and Syria had begun to replace Greece as Egypt's foremost source of hashish by the 1910s. 3 Even so, smuggling across the mandates has remained a neglected subject of historical study. 4 More fundamentally, most historians of the Middle East have reflexively chosen the new, single polities of the post-Ottoman Levant as their framework of analysis. This focus has had empirical and interpretive consequences. Individuals who regularly cross borders fall through the cracks of new nation-state analytical frameworks or are summarily integrated into them; legal and illegal cross-border movements-of people, goods, services, and ideas-and the larger regional networks thus (re-)created after 1918 rarely figure in analyses of the new mandate states. 5 The limitations of "methodological territorialism"-of choosing nation-states as a unit of analysis-are hardly news to historians. 6 Critique of this approach underlies debates about globalization and transnationalism. 7 Scholars now frame these as "dialectical process[es] of de-and re-territorialization," or, in the words of Charles Maier, as the waxing and waning of territoriality: "the properties, including power, provided by the control of bordered political space, which . . . [from ca. 1860 to 1970] created the framework for national and often ethnic identity" around the globe. 8 On a related note, Christopher Bayly and other scholars have argued that at least since the nineteenth century, regional and global historical processes have developed in constant interaction. 9 Not unexpectedly, programmatic overviews of global history 5 However, Keith Watenpaugh has rejected "nationalist and imperialist definitions of the historical and political bounds of call for studies of interactions between "localization, regionalization, nationalization, and transnationalization." 10 Many transnational historians take a similar approach, analyzing cross-border (and often transcontinental) movements without "claim [ing] to embrace the whole world." 11 Some historians of particular regions and countries are following suit. Jürgen Kocka, for instance, maintains that 1989 caused a "double shift of spatial coordinates," of region and nation-state, in Europe. 12 In building on these debates, we can use narcotics trafficking across and beyond Mandatory Lebanon-a phenomenon ranging from the trivially small to the spectacularly large-to examine interactions among people operating on four geographical scales: local areas inside the new country of Lebanon; Lebanon as an emerging nation-state; the larger Levantine region of which it formed a part (and its Egyptian and Turkish neighbors); and international spheres in which the League of Nations' global anti-narcotics policy and Franco-Anglo-Egyptian anti-narcotics police cooperation in the Mediterranean came into play. In a circumscribed space, forces and actors operating on these scales tend to fuse into a distinct, multilayered "pattern of territorialization"; the coexistence of varying patterns within one country then creates "differential territorialization." 13 This process played out differently in two spaces in the Levant: territorial organization took one form in the border zone formed by Jabal Amil (southern Lebanon), the Galilee (northern Palestine), and the Jawlan Heights (the southwesternmost part of Syria), along with the northwesternmost part of Jordan, and a different form in the port and city of Beirut and around the highway along the Mediterranean to the Naqura customs station on the Palestinian border. These distinctive patterns of territorialization helped to shape French Mandate rule. 14 The French, their international colonial stature weakened by World War I, maintained a minimal presence on their side of the mountainous Amili-Galilean-Jawlan border zone. 15 As a result, local trade and trust networks survived territorial division, and until the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the border zone remained an integrated unit. Regional consumer demands-for narcotics, but also for customs-free legal goodswere easily channeled through border-zone networks of trade, trust, and transport. And as the British and French authorities gradually improved local roads, transnational traffickers operating across the Levantine region became active in the border zone, too. Thus, this space-the different parts of which supposedly were nothing more than peripheries of the new nation-states of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan-was a local hub for a particular kind of economy: the gray and black markets of now-separate yet still regionally connected countries.
Beirut, the political and economic heart of Mandatory Lebanon, experienced a different pattern of territorialization. Despite mass immigration and poverty, it survived World War I as the Levantine coast's leading city, and the French expanded and policed its port and the highways that connected it with neighboring countries. Territoriality "à la Maier" was denser here because much was at stake for the internationally present colonial power, France: naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean and security in the mandate; the protection of Beirut as the Levantine region's trade center; and customs revenues, which were crucial to the mandate budget. Egypt's demand for narcotics was felt here perhaps even more than in the border zone, but it was met in different ways. It is not simply that the trade was conducted by poor urbanites, sailors and chauffeurs, merchants with an illegal side business, and transnational professional traffickers. French improvements to the transportation infrastructure boosted the mobility especially of the latter and strengthened or even created region-wide networks of trust. Still, traffickers also had to deal with the strong presence of government officials. The result was endemic corruption that left only small segments of officialdom untouched. In Beirut and along highways such as the road to Naqura, therefore, a distinct pattern of territorialization arose out of a headlong clash between poor locals, the heavily present nation-state (Lebanese) and international-colonial (French) forces, and regionally active transnational smugglers-a clash that, when we look more closely, resembled an intense mutual penetration more than anything else.
French Mandate rule in the Middle East was shaped by the intersection of international, transnational, nation-state, and local actors and constraints. 16 Egypt's unrelenting demand for coordinated anti-narcotics policing in the Eastern Mediterranean, and similar calls by the League of Nations, to which the mandate powers were accountable, forced France to step up its drug-control measures in the 1930s. At the same time, because of their tiny budget and shaky legitimacy, the French, and with them nation-state forces including the French-led Lebanese Gendarmerie, sometimes secured the political support of local power brokers by purposely ignoring their cannabis fields and their trafficking activities. Clearly, even in a country as small as Lebanon, patterns of territorialization were influenced by spaces as immense as that reaching from Western Europe to the Mediterranean. Also, after 1918, pressures on colonial rule were both more extreme and more contradictory than before 1914-and the French could meet them only by vacillating between fundamentally incompatible actions.
ON DECEMBER 23, 1920, BRITAIN AND FRANCE signed an agreement that revised the rough map attached to the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which had served as the basis for the postwar division of the Levant. In June 1921, a joint border commission launched an operation that was virtually unprecedented in the Middle East. 17 It demarcated the Palestinian-Syrian/Lebanese border "by erecting stone cairns, 'boundary pillars,' in the appropriate places." 18 Similar stones were positioned along other mandate borders. But the internal borders of the French and British mandates-separating Lebanon from Syria, and Transjordan from Palestine and Iraqwere all but invisible. Between the mandates, as well as between them and Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, borders did not create quick faits accomplis. 19 Along the Palestinian-Syrian/Lebanese border, the number of customs officials, gendarmes, policemen, and soldiers was kept to a minimum: the British and French ran their mandates on a budget that was barely adequate, exercising strict control over every expenditure. 20 The hills and mountains in the border zone complicated policing; even more important, the zone's economic and security value was too small to warrant large expenses. (The one serious exception occurred in 1936-1939, when Lebanese and Syrians crossed the zone to support the Palestinian Revolt.) Especially the British, but also the French, relied inter alia on some upgraded roads, the French on a few intelligence officers, and both on local power brokers in their efforts to ensure minimal territorial control. 21 Hence, northern Palestine (the Galilee, including towns such as Safed and the nearby port cities of Akka and Haifa), southern Lebanon (Jabal Amil, including the towns of Marjayoun and Bint Jbeil and the nearby port of Tyre), the southwesternmost part of Syria (the Jawlan Heights, including the town of Quneitra), and the northwesternmost part of Transjordan continued to form a single socioeconomically 17 In the Arab provinces of the late Ottoman Empire, the only real precedent to postwar border demarcations was the 1906 demarcation of the border between British-controlled Egypt and Palestine, which, however, barely affected daily life. See Nurit Kliot, "The Development of the Egyptian-Israeli Boundaries, integrated border zone. It was inhabited by Sunni Bedouins who raised livestock; Sunni, Shi i, Christian, and Druze peasants (and a few Zionist Jews) who grew subsistence crops and, especially in hilly Jabal Amil and the northern Galilee, tobacco cash crops; and merchants of all confessions who had products to trade. 22 To them, crossing the border was an everyday occurrence. Even children knew the often difficult terrain around their villages and across the border well. Cross-border samefaith marriages continued, and people still took temporary refuge from their colonial authorities across the border, even with neighbors who did not belong to their confession. In the few Zionist settlements, many Jews could get by in Arabic, and some of their Arab neighbors knew some Yiddish or Hebrew. Economic ties were crucial: for example, the Suq Khamis (Friday Market) in Bint Jbeil was frequented by Palestinians, and the flourishing city of Haifa attracted Lebanese and Syrians. 23 Nearby Damascus was a tangible commercial presence, especially in the eastern part of the border zone. Beirut was less important (except, perhaps, for the richer inhabitants of Jabal Amil), even though the Ottomans had created the new wilayat (province) of Beirut in 1888, bringing the area from Lattakiyah down almost to Jaffa under a near-continuous administrative umbrella. 24 Around that same time, Beirut's rising star had started to outshine its rivals Tripoli and Saida as well as Amili caravan routes. Its merchants introduced cash crops, including tobacco, to Jabal Amil and the Galilee, but "reinvested the money earned and established [ 28 But Amili and Galilean peasants were hit much earlier than merchants by the sociopolitical changes in their area and its peripheralization. The 1858 Ottoman Land Code led to "the concentration of property in the hands of a few rich . . . rural notables . . . [and] bourgeois from Saida and Beirut." 29 By the turn of the century, a landless proletariat had emerged, and they were suffering under "true feudal tyrants." 30 After the war, the French economic focus on transit trade and finance in Lebanon disadvantaged agriculture and traditional manufacturing, which were further stunted by the Great Depression of the 1930s. Eager to secure political stability in the rural peripheries, the French made sure that the landowning and the bourgeois merchant elites could continue to exploit their peasants. Together, these factors exacerbated the already "marked social inequalities." 31 To make things worse, emigration, a vital demographic pressure valve, dropped to critical levels after 1914. In 1900, the annual emigration rate had been approximately 15,000, but that number declined precipitously during the war. It climbed to a minor peak of 6,000 in 1928 before falling back to 1,500 after 1930, where it leveled off. Foreign immigration restrictions in the 1920s, especially in the United States, and again in the 1930s, in response to the Great Depression, meant that Lebanon's rural poor stayed home. In geographically central Mount Lebanon, people tried to escape misery by migrat- Movements of goods and people across the borders of Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria were the subject of a 1926 Anglo-French good neighbor agreement. It allowed inhabitants of the border districts of Acre and Safed in Palestine, Tyre, Marjayoun, and Hasbaya in Lebanon, and Quneitra in Syria "to cross the frontier freely and without a passport and to transport, from one side to the other of the frontier, their animals and the natural increase thereof, their tools, their vehicles, their implements, seeds and products of soil or subsoil of their lands, without paying any customs duties or any dues for grazing or watering or any other tax on account of passing the frontier and entering the neighbouring territory." 33 At first glance, crossing the border indeed seemed routine. Even the decision to make laissez-passers mandatory and the order that the border be crossed only at customs points seem like a less than dramatic measure. In southern Lebanon, these travel documents could be obtained at minimal cost from French administrators. More crucially, people could-and most did-cross the border between the few customs posts without papers.
Examined up close, however, the laissez-passer influenced people's lives in subtle yet decisive ways. Administrative glitches were common. 34 And for ordinary Amilis and Palestinian and Syrian inhabitants of the border zone, the border, though barely visible, actually reinforced socioeconomic inequalities. The lack of travel permits ultimately left them vulnerable to situations in which the state actually was present; more precisely, it signaled that a person did not have the social connections necessary to deal with occasional intrusions by the state. These could take the form of sporadic identity card controls and, more crucially, of changes to the letter of the 1926 good neighbor agreement and abuses of power. 35 Undocumented peasants were also more likely to be arrested than were people of local importance, who habitually got away with serious offenses. This was the case for smuggling as well, including of narcotics. 36 Officials' differential treatment of ordinary and better-connected smugglers was not the only way in which trafficking reflected general conditions within the border zone. Conditions there facilitated the movement of contraband. Peasants' poverty and their knowledge of the terrain made them cheap and resourceful carriers. In addition, strong socioeconomic ties were built on reliable networks of trust, and state presence was weak. And while the expansion of roads was beneficial for moving troops, others could take advantage of it, too. Hence, because of economic decline and decreasing emigration abroad, some border-zone peasants depended not only on tobacco cash crops, but also on smuggling to make ends meet. It was a profitable business because the prices of goods multiplied once they were transported across borders (not least because of the high French customs duties). 37 Thus, paradoxically, the very existence of a border was the silver lining in the dark cloud hanging over the marginalized Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian border zone. The zone linked the cannabis and opium poppy fields of Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey with Egypt, and the now-diverging economies of new neighboring countries created demands that were often met by smuggler-suppliers from across the border. In sum, three national peripheries combined to form a local hub not just for legal trade, but for regionally connected gray and black markets as well.
But people did not profit equally. Rather than buying and reselling drugs, peasants served as carriers between Lebanese pick-up and Palestinian drop-off points. On the Rmeiche-Hurfesh route, for example, young locals familiar with the territory moved drugs across the border for a fee. They alternated between two different routes, communicating by sound signals to evade patrols. 38 professional smugglers tapped into preexisting local socioeconomic ties built upon networks of trust that were crucial for trafficking. Such chains were typical not only for narcotics smuggling, but also for illegal immigration and arms trafficking. 39 At the same time, motorized long-distance smugglers were increasingly active across the border zone. Typically, in 1945, Haifa-based Abud Yasin was described as "shuttling between Palestine and Zahle via Ain-Ebel." 40 Professional cab and truck drivers increasingly moonlighted as smugglers, and soldiers-whose army vehicles were rarely monitored-often worked as long-range intermediaries, especially during World War II. 41 These developments were facilitated by the high volume of cars being imported into Lebanon, and by the slow but steady expansion of roads in the border zone. By the 1920s, there was already routine motorized access to Naqura and Marjayoun, the western and eastern ends of Lebanon's southern border, respectively; entering the border zone by car was possible but difficult. 42 Across the border in Palestine, the north-south Metullah-Safed road, originating in Marjayoun, 42 The easily drivable access roads were those that ran from Beirut to Tyre to Naqura, and from there on to Haifa and Egypt; from Beirut to Jezzine to Marjayoun, and from there on to Metullah, Safed, and Haifa; and from Baalbek to Zahle, Hasbaya, and Marjayoun. SR, Poste du Sud Liban, "É tude sommaire de la region du Djebel Amel," 3, Marjayoun, June 20, 1930, Box 2200, MAE-Nantes, states that the Tyre-Bazuriyyah-Jouaya, Tyre-Hanawiyyah-Qana, Tyre-Abbasiyyah, and Naqura-Alma Sha ab roads in western South Lebanon, although in "very bad condition," were drivable. SS, Liban Sud, Marjayoun, "Documentation générale, dossier politique," 19-21, August 1931, Box 2201, MAE-Nantes, shows that in eastern South Lebanon, roads were usable, though equally bad. On another note, there were approximately 1,000 cars in Lebanon by 1921, 3,700 in 1926, and 8,000 in 1931. See "Multiplication des automobiles," Asie française, January 1932, 35. In 1931, there was one car for every seventy-five people in Lebanon, a ratio six times that for Egypt, for instance. See "Les automobiles au Liban," Asie française, and the east-west Safed-Akka road linked the border zone to Haifa and Egypt; many of the north-south "mountain tracks" to the Safed-Akka road were also drivable. 43 In the Galilee, roads were later expanded and paved in part to offset the weak presence of the state, including security forces. This process peaked in 1937 with the construction of an east-west road between the Safed-Akka road and the border, an early reaction to the 1936-1939 Palestinian Revolt, which was also supported by Syrians and Lebanese. 44 Rebels operating in the border zone sabotaged roads to slow down British security forces. But their arms suppliers drove on those roads, too-and then and later, they were also used to smuggle narcotics, people, and legal goods. Such movement was further facilitated when in World War II the British built two east-west roads off the border's southern and northern sides. 45 Two decades earlier, a visitor to Palestine had contrasted prewar travel with the present "uninterrupted, dense motorized traffic in all cities and on all highways" and praised the "effortless journey in a day from Jerusalem to Metullah." Routinization, the disappearance of "adventures," characterized traffic after the war. It helped shape trafficking, too-even in the border zone. 46 BY THE LATER NINETEENTH CENTURY, Beirut had become the Levant's principal trade hub. Emboldened by their success in lobbying for the new Ottoman province of Beirut (1888), merchants there helped convince Istanbul to build a modern road to Damascus (1863), to expand the port so that it could support steamships (1888), and to accept a French-financed railway from Beirut to Damascus (1895). Economic growth, refugee crises, and rural-urban migration caused the population to swell from around 10,000 in the 1840s to 150,000 in 1915. Around 1850, the mercantile elite began to abandon the cramped old city for adjoining areas such as Zuqaq alBlat. 47 Five decades later, a British guidebook admired the "broad streets and splendid houses": Beirut was being transformed by privately owned streetcar lines and Ottoman projects, including lighting, a modern water supply, and public spaces such as the Place des Canons and the Lighthouse and Pine Forest promenades. 48 Hence, in 1918, Beirut was already the Levantine coast's largest and busiest city. Determined to keep things that way, the French widened streets to accommodate motorized traffic and extended avenues and streetcar lines to the mushrooming suburbs. 49 Beirut changed from the bottom up, too: the drop in emigration, the push of rural poverty, and the pull of the city's reputation as Lebanon's workhouse accelerated its growth. The 1932 count of 161,382 Beirutis underestimated the population. By a decade after the war, the number of inhabitants in the city's "residential areas had almost double [d] ." Tens of thousands of World War I refugees, including Armenians, and rural poor were crowded into Beirut's outskirts in the "first slums." 50 Although the city's population had rebounded after a terrible World War I famine, its social texture had not. The contraction of elite-run communal social services was exacerbated by the rapidly increasing rural-urban migration and the hemorrhaging of traditional manufacture, which took a turn for the worse during the Great Depression. 51 The results showed not only in the slums. Lower-and lower-middle-class inhabitants of neighborhoods such as Basta, Musaitbeh, and Ra s Beirut fell on harder times, too. Some found at least temporary employment in the transport and service sectors and in import-substitution factories, but many were not so fortunate. The 1930s in particular witnessed bitter poverty, as "real wages in cities fell by half" and "unemployment reached an estimated 30 percent." 52 This situation provoked labor protests and helped lead to the rise of trade unions. But it also encouraged prostitution and petty crime such as pickpocketing. These illegalities clustered where money and people were on the move: at Beirut's largest square, the Place des Canons (also known as the Place des Martyres), which was crowded with shoppers, moviegoers, café visitors, hotel guests, sailors from the adjacent port, and travelers using the many long-distance cabs and buses that arrived or departed from here. 53 That the Place des Canons was so busy, and such a draw for petty criminals and prostitutes, was due partly to French investment in transport infrastructure. The French doubled the size of Beirut's port by 1934, and in 1938 they modernized it by adding deep-water docks. They also strengthened the city's local links to the regional highway infrastructure and invested in railroads and highways. A northbound highway led to Tripoli, Lattakiyah, and Aleppo, then on to Aintab in Turkey; an eastbound highway connected Beirut to Damascus and Baghdad; and a southbound highway followed the Mediterranean coast to Naqura and from there to Haifa. 54 Lebanon and Syria had 9,700 kilometers of drivable roads by 1939, up from 1,300 kilometers in 1919; the railway, although expanded from 870 kilometers to 1,520 kilometers in the same timespan, thus "was supplanted by motor vehicles and lorries." 55 Entre- The French expanded the transport networks for several reasons. Transit trade and related commercial services were central to Mandatory Lebanon's political economy, a fact also reflected in mercantile competition between the French and the British from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. 57 Territorial end points of national transport and trade networks, including Naqura and Port Beirut customs, were central to a mandate budget that relied heavily on customs revenues. 58 Finally, Beirut was the French navy's main port in the Eastern Mediterranean, and highways and railways facilitated troop movements. 59 Hence state territoriality was denser in Beirut and on the highways than in the border zone. A police regulation requiring hotels to inform the police about any new foreign guest within twenty-four hours was implemented with special vigor in the capital. The French navy jealously controlled one part of Beirut's port. The other part was policed by three civil security forces: the police, the Sûreté générale (SG), and the customs police, who at times were joined by the Gendarmerie; all four were French-led arms of the emerging Lebanese nationstate (and all would be retained after independence). The Gendarmerie was a wellarmed force that used a considerable portion of its personnel to patrol Lebanon's highways and rural roads. During the Palestinian Revolt, these patrols were intensified to help Britain keep non-Palestinians out of Palestine. Finally, at the Naqura customs station, the customs police, the Gendarmerie, the SG, and the political Services spéciaux were all present. Yet trafficking persisted. For one thing, the expanding transport networks made it easier: illegal trade fed off, and fed into, France's official policy regarding transit trade. 61 On freshly paved highways, recently introduced cars cut travel time from days to hours, which was vital for smugglers dodging the police. Zahle, for instancewhose position as the Bekaa Valley's trading center had been strengthened with the 1895 opening of the Beirut-Damascus railroad, and where drug smugglers lived alongside large landowners who grew most of the cannabis for Lebanon's hashishwas now a two-hour drive from Beirut. 62 Improved transportation also eliminated the need for intermediaries between opium producers in southeastern Turkey and professional smugglers in Lebanon's capital. Aleppines, the only strong go-betweens left, often visited Beirut or resided there, working with accomplices in their native city to smuggle drugs to their new home. 63 Farther south, Lebanese and Palestinian smugglers sometimes traveled to Egypt by car or train to collect separately shipped cargoes and sell them directly to Egyptian buyers. 64 Collaborating groups fielded permanent "liaison officers" who commuted between Egypt and Lebanon by car, train, or ship to help settle payments and organize transports. 65 Professional smugglers profited from the expanding transport infrastructure in cities, too. In Beirut they hid large narcotics cargoes in warehouses and homes in sprawling new suburbs such as Furn al-Shubak as well as older, more central neighborhoods such as middle-to upper-class Zuqaq al-Blat or lower-to middle-class Basta, waiting for an opportunity to move the contraband southward. 66 But they did not operate alone. Café owners and tobacco concessionaires mediated between pro-fessionals trafficking en gros and occasional smugglers, many of them poor Beirutis hit by the economic downturn. 67 The Place des Canons was the center for this trade. 68 Some buyers here were consumers; others resold the drugs, either then and there or in the adjacent port.
The poverty and petty crime that were part of Beirut's Place des Canons also helped shape life at the waterfront. On November 3, 1934, port day laborer Mustafa el-Turk was caught smuggling 1.9 kilograms of opium onto the Felix Roussel for a sailor who had recruited him the night before at the Place des Canons and promised him two Syrian pounds (SP) for successful delivery. El-Turk went through with the transaction, in which the merchandise cost 750 times the value of his service, most likely because he was afraid, wished to keep his reputation, or was unable to contact a Beiruti customer because he was excluded from local selling networks. 69 Be that as it may, he was in a weak trade position that mirrored his poverty and marginality. In 1934, a Beiruti worker with a family of five had a minimum of SP420 in average monthly expenses-210 times el-Turk's fee. Considering the fact that the sentence for smuggling was three months in prison, SP2 does not seem like much. 70 Like some poor in the border zone, however, Beiruti laborers were fortunate in their misfortune. Living at a regional trade chokepoint offered them opportunities without which they would have been even worse off. 71 And although the pittance they earned was insufficient to feed their families, it suggests that courier service was not overly risky.
This was true for sailors as well, who perfectly embodied the regional nature of Eastern Mediterranean drug smuggling. 72 Certain ship crews were notorious smug-glers. 73 In Port Beirut, they often moved narcotics from one ship to another without ever coming on land. At sea, some operated on their own; others guarded large cargoes for professional drug-smuggling groups. 74 Their task was not too difficult. In ports, transit smuggling was exceedingly hard to prevent; at sea, ships were effectively monitored only in times of crisis such as the Palestinian Revolt, when the search for arms caused collateral damage to narcotics trafficking. 75 They, as well as professional and occasional poor smugglers, profited from the fact that in Port Beirut, as in other transport hubs around the world, "the state [was] somewhat blinded by the frenzy of activity." 76 In fact, as on highways, so in Port Beirut smugglers prof- ited from France's investment in transit infrastructure. The French made considerable efforts to secure this infrastructure-but they could not keep up with the amount of trade and trafficking it helped to create.
Denser, faster transportation networks had other consequences. In the border zone, professional smugglers relied on local trust networks (even as they increasingly bypassed them by way of the expanding roads); beyond the zone, Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian professionals were united through the use of a loosely shared space. It was a more imagined space than that, for example, of a Rmeichi who knew the path to neighboring Hurfesh like the back of his hand: it was created by cars and trains, which turned terrain that was tough going on foot into a fast-moving landscape when traveled on wheels. But precisely for this reason, shared geography was more than an image: the faster the trip, the easier the visit, and routine and trustworthy relationships could be established across longer distances. As a result, many Aleppine smugglers operated out of Beirut, and Abud Yasin, while based in Haifa, was as often as not in Beirut or on the road to Aleppo. 77 Meeting places and residences reflected this mobility. Cafés and hotels were often used because they were not fully public spaces and thus offered a modicum of privacy-a Gazan smuggler's Cairo hotel was described as his "pied-à-terre," for example-but unlike private apartments, they could be easily abandoned. 78 But trust networks alone could not ensure smooth smuggling operations. Especially in Beirut, on the highways, and at customs posts, state officials were too strongly present to always be circumvented. Certainly, subterfuge was common. On the Beirut-Naqura-Haifa highway, professional smugglers tried to outsmart Gendarmerie patrols by using fake identity cards, hiding cars beside the road, driving off-road at points, deliberately turning off their lights at night, or using secondary roads; in Naqura, smugglers hid narcotics in often ingenious ways. 79 But more direct means were necessary, too: bribery was often integral to large-scale smuggling. The extent of corruption and independent smuggling operations by officials hints at the financial straits of small-and mid-level state officials. More importantly, it shows that there was no clear boundary separating officials from smugglers, or state from society. Cases such as that of some French officers who used their army vehicles to transport hashish from Zahle to Beirut in the pay of smugglers, or of a Beiruti police inspector who was caught smuggling 3 kilograms of opium in the port, were common in the 1920s and 1930s. 80 They became routine during World War II: a Naqura policeman who helped a narcotics smuggler move hashish to Haifa is only one example of the innumerable Lebanese, Palestinian, French, and British officials who cashed in on the soaring traffic in drugs and other goods. 81 The involvement of higher officials sometimes caused a scandal. In the fall of 1944, for example, two Lebanese policemen were caught using their vehicles to smuggle hashish into Palestine, some of which belonged to Secretary of Parliament Khalil Taki ed Dine and the commander of Lebanon's Securité interne, Colonel Fawzi Trabulsi. 82 This does not mean that the French and Lebanese authorities were completely paralyzed, but it does indicate that many Lebanese did not think that hashish and opium merited total criminalization. As Raymond Edde, the son of Lebanon's president, Emile Edde, explained to the SG director, "we do not understand . . . why the Mandate prohibits the cultivation of hashish, a source of income for our 'villagers.' " 83 Edde was being disingenuous: as will soon become clear, it was people of his rank who enjoyed the windfall from cannabis cultivation. colonial rule was suffering from systematic "indecisions." 85 (This is a point that is often missed by historians of the Middle East.) 86 In Lebanon and Syria, French administrators admired the indirect British colonial government at the same time that they idolized Hubert Lyautey's de facto direct rule in French Morocco. 87 Symptomatically, at the peak of the Syrian Revolt (1925) (1926) (1927) , the new High Commissioner, Auguste Henri Ponsot, openly admitted, "I am going to Syria without a definite program." 88 Then and later, critics deplored the "uncertainty of conception, goals, and methods" and the "astonishing waltz of High Commissioners" in and out of Beirut. 89 In Syrian eyes, the last straw was the 1938 about-face of the socialist-dominated French Parliament: fearful of a resurgent National Socialist Germany, it refused to ratify the independence treaty that its own cabinet had concluded with the Syrian National Bloc two years earlier. A result of both French (in)decisions and transformations in the colonies and the world at large, such twists and turns reflected the unusually complex nature of colonialism following World War I, when at one and the same time, "everything . . . [and] nothing changed." 90 The French Mandate authorities' approach to narcotics reflects this complexity.
142, shows that interwar France had to adapt colonial rule to "dramatic changes" that would peak after 1945. 85 Thobie et al., Histoire de la France coloniale, 138. Certainly, the postwar period saw a general turn to associationism, and the education of colonial administrators and their work became more professional. See Conklin, A Mission to Civilize ; Véronique Dimier, Le gouvernement des colonies: Regards croisés franco-britanniques (Brussels, 2004) . Also, the fact that more than one ministry (Colonies, Foreign Affairs, Interior) governed different territories was not a particularly French condition. For various reasons, however, the postwar French colonial administration was never able to get its bearings. Among the problems were the lack of coordination even inside ministries; the "multiple layers of colonial bureaucracy"; the lowly rank of the Ministry of Colonies in the ministerial hierarchy; unsolved debates about the "nature, purpose, and value of colonial possessions"; and the scant interest of Foreign Affairs and the army in the colonies-i.e., their fixation on Germany, Europe, and the Mediterranean for the hexagon's (rather than imperial) defense. Here the reason was a clash of contrasting pressures that were inscribed in three different-international, transnational, and local-territorial logics. Indeed, the patterns of territorialization interacted with forces that transcended the Middle East.
International pressure was applied by British-ruled Egypt. State officials there became seriously concerned about narcotics after World War I: drug use had been common before 1914, but at that time it was basically limited to hashish. A new phase was ushered in with the arrival of huge quantities of heroin after 1918. 91 Even by global standards, Egypt had become a heavy drug-consuming country. Heroin imports declined by 1930, but that drop was offset by a "marked increase" in the supply of Turkish and Levantine opium and hashish. These had remained prevalent even during heroin's heyday, but were now less tolerated than before 1914. 92 Anglo-Egyptian authorities began to fight narcotics in the mid-1920s, waging the battle far beyond the Middle East. They lobbied for stricter anti-narcotics measures at the Geneva-based League of Nations (Société des Nations [SDN]), stiffened drug-related penalties in Egypt, imprisoned thousands, and urged European capitulatory countries to collaborate in their anti-drug war in Egypt. 93 In February 1927, an Interior Ministry representative and the heads of the Palestinian police, the French Mandate SG, the Alexandria and Cairo city police, and the Egyptian Frontiers Administration and Coast Guard convened in Cairo and decided to tighten anti-narcotics intelligence coordination. Two years later, the newly established Central Narcotics Intelligence Bureau (CNIB) went to work with European and Turkish police forces. 94 As a result, and because Turkey and European countries closed cocaine, heroin, and morphine factories and toughened capitulatory laws in Egypt, the import of these so-called white drugs plummeted by the early 1930s. 95 Around that time, the CNIB also moved to strengthen its ties with the French Mandate police forces. In 1934, years of "repeated complaints by the Egyptian government [and] . . . strong reactions by the Société des Nations" finally bore fruit. The French authorities hardened their stance on narcotics with a decree that energized prosecution and ordered the creation of an SG anti-drug squad with a regional mandate. 96 Anglo-EgyptianFrench anti-narcotics cooperation peaked around 1937 and 1938, as France attempted to eradicate hashish and as anti-trafficking campaigns were implemented that included systematic information exchanges, extraditions, coordinated actions, and even Egyptian undercover operations on French Mandate territory. 97 Never un- 95 Heroin, first synthesized in 1874, began to be manufactured by the German firm Bayer and soon by other companies, including British Macfarlan in 1898 (morphine was first extracted from opium in early-nineteenth-century Europe; cocaine became popular in the late nineteenth century). , cooperation declined by the late 1930s. World War II caused a reshuffling of priorities and strengthened regional transport and economic integration through the Middle East Supply Center, which also allowed trafficking to climb to new levels. 98 Interestingly, the tactics employed by the police in coordinating anti-narcotics efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean resembled those used to deal with another concern of colonial rulers in the mandates, Egypt, and beyond: anticolonial communists and nationalists who disregarded new borders. 99 It was no coincidence that the SG bore sole responsibility for both the communist and the narcotics portfolios. Almost from the moment in the mid-1920s when police coordination was institutionalized throughout the region to buttress individual countries' political security, it was geared to socioeconomic concerns, too. 100 But it reflected another new trend as well: the willingness to tackle transnational problems internationally. Prewar precedents notwithstanding, it was only after 1918 that "the drug problem" was urgently framed "as a social evil" and that the newly founded League of Nations was given some say in the matter. 101 Regarding narcotics, tougher Egyptian laws and pressure on other states preceded action through and by the SDN. 102 Still, it was a globally active player in its own right. Numerous stipulations of the League's 1936 Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs signaled "new developments of national law which had to be modified to implement the convention." 103 Also, Egypt lobbied other governments, not only through bilateral contacts but through the SDN. It publicly praised French anti-narcotics cooperation at the League, and the elation of the Quay d'Orsay-to which the mandate authorities were administratively subordinated and by which they were represented at the SDN-shows how eager Paris was to appear reputable in Geneva. 104 In fact, the care that France took to collaborate with the SDN, especially in the 1930s, when anti-narcotics control improved, shows how "opinion-sensitive governments" after World War I managed to avoid being criticized "by adjusting course." 105 The French admitted that the League's "strong reactions" helped to push Paris into hardening its stance on narcotics in 1934; and the dismissal of the SDN in the late 1930s by Lebanese critics of this policy demonstrates that the Lebanese understood that the organization had leaned on Paris. 106 Regarding French Lebanon and Syria, the SDN had extra leverage because these countries were League mandates, and their authorities, in however limited a way and through the Quay d'Orsay, were accountable to Geneva. France's cooperation in the Egyptian-led war on narcotics thus was not just a case of playing ball with its ally, the British Empire, in a matter of vital importance to London's key possession in the Eastern Mediterranean; neither was it simply a byproduct of political security coordination. It was also a response to a new climate conducive to certain limitations on colonial rule, not unlike French and British African mandate policies, which, while they fit national interests, were "more restrained and more internationally-oriented" than elsewhere in their empires. 107 But there was more than one side to French narcotics policy. On May 7, 1940, Khaled Abdul Kader, a former member of Parliament from Akkar in northern Lebanon, sent a letter to the district's French administrative counselor. Earlier that spring, Lattakiyah customs authorities had ordered him to pay SP235,900 for having organized, twice in 1939, the smuggling of a total of 1,680 kilograms of opium and hashish via Cyprus to Palestine. Kader swore that the witnesses against him had been bribed. He concluded: "You know my feelings of fidelity and loyalty, and those of my relatives and friends in Akkar. If you believe that I am worthy of your interest, I beg you to do something." The counselor complied. Without delay, he informed the High Commissioner's Direction des affaires politiques (AP) that while he could not "vouch for Khaled Bey Abdul Kader's innocence, I have to point out that during these last years, [he] has been extremely correct with us, and that it would be appropriate to examine his claim with a certain magnanimity." 108 A year later, with the sentence still pending, the counselor forwarded a second letter by Kader to the AP; advising "great lenience," he reported on the outcome of an inquiry that the AP had instructed him to make with customs. Its director, Roux, had indicated that "penalties of [Kader's] kind are normally treated in a transaction between Customs and the delinquent." 109 He later specified that the "going rate" was a third of the penalty and, testing the AP's position on the counselor's advice, inquired whether "political considerations weigh in favor of [further] reducing the [rate] ." 110 Having created the possibility of a deal by instructing the counselor to contact Roux, the AP could now afford to take a step back. It adroitly removed itself from the process. "There are no political objections to a transaction between you and the delinquent; however, there is no reason why the HC would act in a particular way in favor of Mr. Khaled Bey Abdul-Kader, who is a notorious smuggler." 111 The outcome of Kader's case is undocumented. But the normalcy of "administrative transactions," the absence of a prison sentence, the French short-circuiting of court procedure, and the dealings between Kader and the French as well as among various French offices highlight the political limits to an all-out attack on narcotics. The French administration was not of one mind in this regard. Responsible for regional anti-narcotics cooperation, the SG-a dedicated but small unit-took a hard line. In contrast, many Lebanese policemen and gendarmes and key French political administrators and security officers responded halfheartedly at best. The former were scared of powerful politicians or were smugglers themselves; the latter protected political allies to stabilize French rule. They did so in particular with the power brokers who dominated Lebanon's rural peripheries of Akkar (to the north), the Bekaa Valley (to the east), and Jabal Amil (to the south). Men such as Kader stood on the sidelines of the mandate's leading economic sectors (international trade, finance, and the import-substitution industry, all centered in Beirut) and made use of narco money to maintain their local authority. And precisely because the mandatory budget was limited, the French frequently tolerated the use of profits made in the regional drug trade to buy off some of the Lebanese elite, attenuating their weakness to co-opt key players in economically marginalized areas. This brings to mind political-economic analyses of the tacit use of corruption in late colonial Africa; it also suggests that the cases of bribed officials were not isolated incidents, but in fact were part of a wider-perhaps even systemic-order of corruption. 113 The power of certain politicians in the Lebanese government-advised and controlled, but not totally monitored, by the French-formed another, less personal, more institutional limit to French anti-narcotics efforts. The scandal that erupted in June 1939 after the SG discovered that Minister of Agriculture Ibrahim Haidar was growing cannabis for hashish on his own land is illustrative. Not incidentally, Haidar was a notable from the predominantly Shi i northern Bekaa, which, along with the valley's south, was one of the country's principal agricultural centers-and since the nineteenth century had been Lebanon's primary source of hashish. 114 Haidar's case was not exceptional. In 1937 and 1938, the SG had aggressively eradicated even small cannabis fields. But the following year, many Bekaa peasants again sowed cannabis. They had "received formal assurances" that there would be no negative repercussions "from highest-ranking Lebanese personalities," whose own resumption of cannabis cultivation constituted a "most extreme example" to the peasants. 115 Predictably, Egypt reiterated its demand for the French to take strong action. 116 The SG argued that the resurgence of hashish was due to the "complicity of the Lebanese government," which also explained the "inactivity of the Lebanese Gendarmerie" that had kept the SG in the dark. 117 The political limits of the gen-darmes were evident also when local resistance initially stalled their eradication campaign, which was further restricted by personnel shortages later that summer. 118 As for Haidar, a district court inconvenienced the owner of Lebanon's second-largest cannabis field-whose 52,000 square meters would have produced 104 tons of hashish-with a SP200 fine, the value of 220 grams. It is unclear whether Haidar paid. 119 If Kader's case illustrates how the French dealt with an influential individual who was involved in the narcotics business, the Haidar affair points to their recurrent acquiescence with the way in which some politicians abused their positions in the new nation-state-wide government. These two dimensions were not clearly distinct, but reflected the weight of intertwined, informal and institutionalized, sources of power. Haidar the Bekaa notable, who routinely "mediated vendettas between [local] Shi i families," enlisted hundreds of the valley's inhabitants to send protest telegrams to the High Commissioner; Haidar the minister delayed an internal report on hashish by the government's agricultural engineer in the Bekaa, subsequently demoted him, fired other state employees, and recruited several ministers who were eager to "save the government's prestige" with the public and the High Commissioner. 120 As director of agriculture in 1924, Haidar had "succeeded in obtaining from the government very important benefits for his family" since the early years of the mandate. 121 His family exemplified the integration of some rural elite Shi i families into the new Lebanese state, facilitated in their case by Ibrahim Haidar's study at the French É cole nationale supérieure d'agronomie in Grignon. Haidar's new ministerial source of power strengthened his family's position. A 1931 governmental irrigation project in the northern Bekaa likely was not a disinterested venture. Primarily for geological reasons, "irrigation [was] . . . expensive and inefficient" in the Bekaa; thus "only lucrative cash crops [made] it worthwhile." 122 Access to the government not only protected hashish production, but fueled it through the abuse of public money for private business involving one of interwar Lebanon's primary agricultural products.
Hashish was a crucial resource for a family whose world had first collapsed, then risen from the ashes after the 1918 separation of the Bekaa from Syria and annexation to Lebanon. The Haidars reacted to this French move by putting their eggs in different baskets. While some militated against the new colonial power for the independence of Greater Syria, including Lebanon, many recognized that their valley's reorientation offered new opportunities, too. One was to "ruin the influence" of the Hamadehs, the preeminent northern Bekaa family whose vassals the Haidars had been. Although French-mandated Lebanon certainly was not the Haidars' dream, the family understood that the only game in town now was played in Beirut, and that the rewards for participating were great, especially for newcomers without major independent resources. Ibrahim Haidar, from a valley that the Beiruti and Mount Lebanese elites knew little about, and that they did not control, cashed in right from the start. He managed to convince the government that his family was the only one that "could, by its exclusive influence, retain the Bekaa Shi is," thereby securing for his relatives "the most important and lucrative jobs." The Haidars did not eliminate their rivals, but eventually drew even with them, in part by translating their access to governmental resources into narco money. When the 1939 scandal broke, Ibrahim Haidar's and Mustafa Rostom Haidar's combined cannabis plots were almost twice the size of Sabri Hamadeh's. Six years later, at the tail end of the (now free) French presence in Lebanon, Ibrahim Haidar's position was as secure as ever, enabling him to successfully lobby the British-led World War II Middle East Supply Center for agricultural machinery. 123 THUS PATTERNS OF TERRITORIALIZATION DIFFER even within small countries, and the local, nation-state, transnational, and international forces and actors that create them help shape political rule. The Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian-Transjordanian border zone-weakly policed by mandate colonial officials and their respective (nation-state) subordinates; suffused by strong local trade and trust networks; often poor and peripheral to new national economies; yet increasingly linked to their central regions by roads, and thus penetrated also by transnational traffickers active across the region-became a local hub that connected new national gray and black markets. Beirut, its port, and highways such as the one to Naqura and onward to Haifa-more strongly policed; central to new national economies and dominated by strong traders' networks; rich but at the same time, and sometimes even in the same 122 Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, 57, mention narcotics. places, poor; the darling of French infrastructure builders; and thus extremely attractive also for traffickers-constituted a space of intense mutual penetration between state (colonial-international and nation-state) and societal (local and transnational) actors, and of high-intensity legal as well as illegal trade.
State energy-territoriality à la Maier-was not a mirage. But it clustered in some places and dissipated in others. Perhaps most crucially, it bent and was bent by forces such as the wealth created by regional trafficking and vast local areas of poverty. As for French Mandate rule, it too was shaped by forces beyond the Middle East: the Egyptian CNIB's reach across the entire Mediterranean and into Western Europe, and the League of Nations' intercontinental anti-narcotics policy. Responsiveness to international pressures was constrained by local considerations, including the fact that after a crippling world war, colonial France had to be ever more accommodating of local power brokers in order to maintain its global position. Regarding narcotics, the end result was less a policy and more a complex, even contradictory, muddlingthrough-a situation characteristic of the treacherous colonial state of affairs as a whole after 1918.
IN MARCH 1939, THE BRITISH CONSULATE in Beirut asked the French High Commissioner to arrest five Palestinians who were allegedly shipping arms from Lebanon via the coast in Gaza to rebels in hilly central Palestine. In an assessment of the request, the SG noted that one suspect, Abud Yasin, was a known narcotics smuggler; that "three of [his] family members [had] recently been executed by Palestinian terrorists who accused them of being lukewarm towards the Arab cause [and that Yasin] was likewise condemned to death"; but that his involvement in weapons trafficking had not yet been proven. 124 Did the violence frighten Yasin? Probably. Did this fear make him run arms for the very people who reportedly had executed his kin? Possibly. We will never know for sure; the paper trail fades away on an inconclusive note.
Still, Yasin's tale can be used to bring into focus an underlying feature of the larger story told here: actors operating on various geographical scales are not stacked atop each other. They always interplay, sometimes forming durable networks. This also explains why local patterns of territorialization created by linked actors and forces are as structured by political and economic orders as are global movements of goods and people. 125 The border zone's pattern of territorialization differed from that of Beirut and its highway corridors because the power and behavior of the various actors operating there differed. A specific pattern was written into its space and configured it. At the same time, space helped to shape a pattern. The border zone's hills and mountains often stood in the way of the state's eyes, and its ears were frequently deafened by the din of big cities such as Beirut. To reformulate in terms of time rather than space: the transnational did not succeed, or emerge from, already established national frameworks. This well-argued point is thrown into relief by the case of the post-World War I Levant, where certain local, nation-state, transnational, and international processes unfolded simultaneously. 126 It was in the wake of 1918 that Lebanon was politically configured as a new nation-state, yet one made up of distinct local areas. It was in 1918 and the following three decades, too, that sweeping changes-in transport and communications, also due to colonial economic policies-tied this new country into the Levant more firmly than before. It was again from 1918 onward that a number of countries, especially colonial powers, stepped up cooperation to address transnational phenomena such as trafficking. And may we not venture that the postwar Levant was a variation on a general norm rather than an exception? After all, even in 1914, nation-states were still relatively new, barely existed or had become a model but not yet a sociopolitical reality, were incessantly reshaped by immigrants, or constituted robust but porous polities. 127 To historians of the modern Middle East, certainly, the story of Yasin and company shows the limits of thinking along nation-state lines alone. The question is not whether the states that (re-)formed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries across the Middle East and North Africa had no roots whatsoever: many did. 128 The point is that particularly in the countries that rose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, social networks-some of them very local, others quite far-flung-that now became transnational helped to shape the development of the Levantine region and its new polities. 129 This is underscored by another matter: globally, the interwar years witnessed an increase in the number of differing territorial processes that interacted, and sometimes collided, with greater intensity than before. The gigantic migration flows crisscrossing the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans demonstrate that such processes were not weak before 1914. It was their number, and thus friction between them, that increased after World War I. International cooperation intensified, in part bilaterally (for example, between colonial powers), but also through the new League of Nations. Nation-state and local territorial processes were hardened as well, especially but not only in new Eastern European or Levantine countries. Some transnational movements, including transatlantic labor migration, decreased yet did not cease, and they were counterbalanced to some extent by increased regional flows; others blos- 127 Italy and Germany were two relatively new nation-states; in many colonial territories, the nationstate barely existed even as an idea; for the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires, India, and China, the nation-state was a model but not (yet) the dominant sociopolitical reality. Immigration societies included the United States, Argentina, and Australia. France and Britain were robust nationstates that were also, however, imperial centers and in that sense inherently connected to the outside world.
128 See Ilya Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System," International Spectator 20, no. 2 (1985): 20-32, who, however, excludes all Levant mandate states other than Lebanon. 129 Indeed, a recent conference identified "movement of capital, labor, goods, and services across the newly created frontiers" as key fields of future research: Rashid Khalidi, "Concluding Remarks," in Méouchy and Sluglett, British and French Mandates in Comparative Perspectives, 699-700.
